1. Boredom

   1. Patience

Notes

Book I: Boredom

§1. In this essay, I will attempt to prove that boredom is a uniquely significant emotion/mood and problem, and then solve said problem. This essay is not too logically constrained, insofar as the main truths presented here are closer to contingently-universal in this ‘world’, rather than necessary. The arguments I am setting forward apply to humans, along with most sentient life we know of. I do not dispute that it is possible that an alien species could avoid some of the following conclusions due to biological differences; however, I find this consideration to be irrelevant at the moment.

§2.

Definition 1: Boredom is a form of suffering which accompanies a lack

of stimulation.

Proposition 1: Boredom is omnipresent in the sense that all things become progressively boring with time, or else already start off so.

This essay will attempt to prove Proposition 1 and then provide a solution to the clear problem that this poses.

§3. The sole property of boredom, which gives it a privileged place within the existence of those who experience it, is its omnipresence. Boredom’s property of omnipresence simply means that it’s always there, either presently being felt or lurking just on the edges of our consciousness, slowly eating away at and eroding whatever present stimulation we are experiencing. Along with this, its negation seems to present us with a difficult problem, whose solution is not apparent from common sense alone.

“All things become boring with time, even the greatest pleasures.”

• Leopardi

“Ennui seems to me the nature of atmosphere, which fills up the spaces between material bodies, and also the voids in the bodies themselves. Whenever a body disappears, and is not replaced by another, air fills up the gap immediately.”

• Leopardi

Proof of boredom’s omnipresence is not difficult to come by due to its tendency to arise when we simply leave ourselves to our own thoughts. One can use a thought experiment to demonstrate it:

Room: Let us imagine ourselves sitting in a room alone, with all of our basic needs (food/water, shelter, sleep) met, not suffering, and simply sitting.

Any reasonable imagining of this scenario would see boredom shortly pop up. One need not even use one’s imagination to demonstrate this idea; sit in a room unoccupied, and feel boredom eventually invade your mind.

“All of humanity’s problems stem from man’s inability to sit quietly in a room alone.”

• Pascal, Pensees

The obvious objection to this assertion is that it only proves that boredom will arise if one is left unoccupied. But a reflection on the path of life itself, a constant jumping from thing to thing, or stimulation to stimulation, shows that this objection is void and that, as Proust puts it, ‘Possession makes everything wither and fade.’ The list of examples of boredom overtaking every facet of human life is near-infinite, but focusing on and analyzing some of the most relevant cases here should be enough to reveal the truth.

§4. Our investigation into boredom’s history must begin as far back as possible; not as an attempt to cover the entire history of boredom from beginning to end, but to dispel a common modern myth within the philosophy of boredom: that boredom is an illness endemic exclusively to modernity. If boredom is truly omnipresent, then it must have always existed within the experience of those who possess the capacity to experience it. Here, I will attempt to show that this was the case.

§5. The earliest mention of boredom afforded by history appears to be dated to around 1700 BCE. It comes from one of the oldest jokes within Ancient Egyptian history:

Q: How does one entertain a bored pharaoh?

A: You sail a boatload of young women dressed only in fishing nets down the Nile and urge the pharaoh to go catch a fish.

Women are one of the most common antidotes to boredom given by later thinkers. We can also take into account Leopardi’s statement that royalty has more reason than others to be completely and absolutely convinced of the omnipresence of boredom within life, for they have at their disposal all possible sources of happiness, and yet are still unsatisfied and plagued by ennui.

To find concrete references to boredom, however, we must jump to the classical period, in which numerous writers took up the subject. The first of these is presented by Homer in his Iliad. Homer, being partially responsible for the formation of the Greek language, was the originator of the term acedia. Homer’s acedia appears in the Iliad, on multiple occasions, in the sense of meaning ‘indifferent’. Specifically, he uses it to reference the way that one feels about a thing that one pays very little mind to, which would seem quite similar to how boredom functions. He also notes:

“Of all things is there satiety, of sleep, and love, and of sweet song, and the goodly dance.”

• Iliad bk 13, 635-40

Here we see the first recognition of boredom’s omnipresence. Boredom suppresses the enjoyment within all things. Homer’s contemporary Hesiod also used acedia in the way Homer describes above.

Jumping forward into Roman times, two Latin authors took up the theme of boredom: Lucretius and Lucian. In his work De Rerum Natura, Lucretius uses it in reference to an aristocrat who moves from place to place attempting to avoid boredom, but finding no respite, as well as to signify that nothing can draw our attention to itself for any meaningful period of time, even though someone experiencing it for the first time would be overcome by pleasure:

“And there is nothing that exists so great and marvelous

that over time mankind does not admire it less and less.”

“True, while we lack that which we long for, it’s an obsession,

But we will just crave something else once it’s in our possession.”

Lucretius leaves us without a solution to this problem, and compels the reader to investigate ‘the nature of things’ in an attempt to uncover the secrets of, and solutions to, boredom.

The next writer to espouse boredom’s omnipresence was the satirist Lucian. In his Dialogue of the Dead between Chiron and Menippus, he tells the story of the god Chiron, who kills himself to avoid the monotonous existence of immortality. Chiron explains to Menippus that no earthly objects can avoid sinking into boredom, so he has decided to leave Earth. However, Menippus asks him why the land of the dead wouldn’t follow a similar trajectory and come to bore him with time. A distraught Chiron then asks Menippus how to avoid this fate, and Menippus leaves us with the unsatisfying answer: ‘Take things as you find them, I suppose, like a sensible fellow, and make the best of everything.’

These examples should convince the reader that boredom is not only a present ill but one that has existed since time immemorial. Taking this into account, we shall now jump further into the future to engage with the main proponents of boredom’s omnipresence.

(Not sure why this formatting issue occurred, but the essay continues below)

§6. A simplified synopsis of Goethe’s Faust could be: a man searches for anything that could provide him with a single moment of happiness. However, giving happiness this privileged position in the synopsis does a disservice to the actual main idea of boredom. Happiness is certainly a real emotion; we have all experienced it, and hence may not understand Faust’s challenge. But we must remember why Faust has such a problem experiencing happiness. Faust’s inability to experience happiness comes from the fact that he is so well learned that all earthly things are familiar to him, and have left him in a state of perpetual boredom, in which nothing can arouse his interest meaningfully. Without Faust’s decades of study, happiness (at least a moment of it) would come quite easily from one of the endeavors he undertakes. Take the language Goethe uses to describe Faust’s dissatisfaction in the scene of Faust’s visit to the tavern: ‘There is nothing for me here.’ These are the words Faust utters when signifying that his moment of happiness will not come from the rabble of the tavern. Now, of course, there are things in the tavern to find enjoyment in, just not for Faust, as, like all things, he has developed the inability to be stimulated by any earthly pleasure. As Care later states: ‘He is starving though there’s plenty’. This line of thought can be found in and applied to all of Faust’s undertakings. Therefore, we may more accurately give the synopsis of Faust as: a man searches for anything which could provide him with a single moment of respite from his boredom.

It is important to note here that without boredom pressing upon Faust, he would not be so distraught and therefore determined to find a moment of happiness. If boredom were naught, he could peacefully exist in his neutrality. This pressing of boredom is often called ‘desire’ (especially when pointed towards a specific object), when it is not called ‘boredom’ or ‘restlessness’.

What eventual solution does Faust find to the problem that he faces? That of imagination. Faust’s moment of respite comes when he removes himself from the present (which is always deadening) and imagines the happiness of the future. However, this happiness is never even allowed to materialize; Faust dies at this very moment. I am here reminded of the words of Schopenhauer, when he says of stories which continue after the hero has achieved their goal:

“The continuation of which would be only a wearisome and meaningless monotony corresponding to boredom.”

Faust’s momentary happiness would be just that, a single moment. Given any length of time, he would soon fall back into the ennui from which he just escaped, and if his story continued, so would the reader.

§7. Let us reimagine ourselves in our room. If we sit for long enough, boredom will arise; we will likely then look for something to occupy ourselves with. This is not always the case, however. Often, we are already inclined towards some object, whether this inclination arose in ourselves or was produced in us through another means. In these cases, when our boredom arises, we feel this inclination strongly and call this desire. We also call desire, that state we feel when we are not able to obtain the object of our desire. However, both of these states could also be called boredom. When we desire an object, separation from this object bores us. Therefore, everything but this object (or other objects we also desire) bores us. Note here that I am referring to what I am inclined to call active-desire, as opposed to passive-desire. Passive-desires include latent desires in the back of one’s mind, such as very weak ones, or desires whose fulfillment could not take place in the near future.

Therefore, we can see that a better way to relate these concepts is as follows:

(a.) Boredom causes us to desire stimulation

(b.) If we desire X, then not-X bores us

(c.) X will eventually bore us as well, given boredom’s omnipresence

Russel’s quote referring to drug addicts shows this relationship:

“The kind of boredom which the person accustomed to drugs experiences when deprived of them is something for which I can suggest no remedy except time.”

‘Accustomed’ signifies boredom of the drug (habituation), and boredom from deprivation is explicitly mentioned. Most of us would not hesitate to say that addicts ‘desire’ their fix (even if they ought not), and that these fixes stimulate the addicts.

§8. Omnipresent is not a term that can be used lightly. Traditionally considered only attributable to a God that possessed various other magnificent qualities, this idea carries with it a totally infinite weight. If we apply it to boredom, a logical conclusion arises which states that boredom is absolutely inescapable for any extended period of time. However, in the history of thought on boredom, numerous writers claimed to have overcome this feeling. Many of their reasons for attempting to overcome boredom even came from the realization of its omnipresence. However, after finding a solution to it, they could no longer claim that it was an omnipresent feeling, meaning that, in light of their discovery, one could dispel boredom. It is quite odd then that these various writers often rejected the solutions of their predecessors and gave their own, differing solutions. To defend boredom’s property of omnipresence, I will here review and rebut two of the most reasonable solutions to the problem of ennui.

§9. The first solution rests on God. Here we will again turn to Pascal, who was significantly invested in the problem of boredom. For Pascal, diversion was the means that the populace attempted to use to escape the omnipresent feeling of ennui. But given its omnipresence, simple distraction could not sate us, as omnipresence denoted infinity. Pascal saw boredom as greater than the entire universe, in that nothing could fill the infinite void it left in our hearts. Nothing except the only other infinite and omnipresent object in existence. Thus, the first solution enters as a kind of deus ex machina, a divine intervention into a problem that nothing else, by itself, can resolve:

“This infinite abyss can be filled only with an infinite and immutable object, in other words, by God.”[22]

• Pascal, Pensees

In contrast to this line of thought, we turn to boredom’s greatest theoretician: Leopardi. Commenting on the attitude towards religious festivals, he states:

“The cause of this is as much the particular cooling of religious feeling, the work both of time in general and of this irreligious time in particular ... and the present-day inability of peoples to be moved and uplifted in spirit except by things that are altogether extraordinary. With us in particular, it is also caused by the utter lack of resistance to our religious opinions, and our religion in general.”

Here Leopardi gives us three main reasons for the inability of religion to stimulate us: (1) the cooling of religious feeling due to time, (2) the fact that religion is not extraordinary, and (3) the lack of resistance to religion.

The first two of these reasons just seem to relegate religion to the level of all other earthly (mundane, from the Latin mundus - world) objects, in that it becomes boring with time and is hence not extraordinary. The final reason is a bit abstract and unimportant to us here, but it references how a lack of resistance leads to boredom. We experience this in the cases of easy challenges, such as those against children. However, given enough time, even difficult challenges become boring as well. While these arguments are rather simple, they seem to me to be able to successfully refute the idea that God is an antidote to boredom. Note that these arguments do not even require one to assume the non-existence of God; only to accept that if God exists, he doesn’t solve the problem of boredom.

§10. I will now review a second commonly prescribed, and I believe the closest, incorrect method of avoiding boredom: that of variety.

“The only thing that is most lastingly and truly pleasurable is the variety of things, for no other reason than that nothing is lastingly and truly pleasurable.”

• Leopardi

‘Variety is the spice of life’ is a common adage that seems simple enough. If repetition and familiarity breed boredom, then the opposite of these - variety - is the antidote to it. This truth almost seems self-evident, but a deeper analysis of boredom reveals a property which supports its omnipresence: the property of acceleration.

If we simply take boredom’s omnipresence as true, then we can already see that the variety argument cannot stand. Boredom’s omnipresence means that all becomes boring; hence, variety itself becomes boring with time. Or as Leopardi more eloquently puts it in a series of passages:

“Continuity is such a great friend of boredom that even the continuity of variety is most tedious.”

“Man grows inured to continuous novelty as he does to uniformity, and the new object is then as familiar to him as an old object, and novelty, in general, is more familiar and ordinary to him than uniformity.”

“The strength and ease and variety of habituation, both in individuals and in mankind, always grow as they grow, precisely like the motion of heavy bodies. This is all there is to the progress both of individuals and of the human mind. This thought is of the utmost importance, and there is no more apt image of this progress in mathematics or physics than that of accelerated motion.”

Therefore, variety fails as a solution to the problem of omnipresent boredom. Continuous exposure to intense pleasurable stimuli seems to leave us numb. The harder we chase pleasure, the more we feel boredom press upon us.

§11. From the analysis of this essay so far, it seems to me that we can accept Proposition 1: Boredom is omnipresent in the sense that all things become boring with time.

Chapter I.I: Patience

§12. Let us take stock of our position. We have accepted Definition 1 and Proposition 1. This leaves us in the position that we now know that boredom is an omnipresent form of suffering accompanied by a lack of stimulation, and that there seems to be no clear escape from it. Given this fact, along with the fact that suffering grounds duties, we see an apparent contradiction:

1. We ought negate boredom

2. Boredom cannot be negated

Attempting to protect ourselves here with ‘ought implies can’ may save us from stating that there is a duty to negate boredom, but does not save us from the fact that our fate is bad. To guard against such a bleak conclusion, we must reject (2). Luckily, I believe that (2) is false and can be rejected.

§13. How might one overcome omnipresence? Given the fact that we cannot ‘go around’ the problem, seeing as there is nothing ‘around’ omnipresence, our only remaining option is to delve into it. Before this truth can be realized, however, we must go deeper in our analysis of boredom.

§14. Boredom functions as such: I am introduced to a thing ‘x’ which may or may not stimulate me. If it does not stimulate me, then boredom will begin emerging nearly instantaneously. If x does stimulate me, then boredom will still emerge, just at a later time, possibly weeks or months after initial contact. Boredom (i) suppresses stimulation and (ii) replaces it with suffering. However, we cannot say that the (i) habituation and (ii) suffering are identical, as boredom often suppresses suffering itself. For an example, we can look to animal farmers, such as pig and cattle farmers.

Time, for them, has eroded the specific stimulation of the oft-unpleasant smell of manure from their consciousness. This does not imply, however, that upon being present near a manure-smelling field, animal farmers will instantaneously experience the pain of boredom; as the pain will only arise if nothing fills this lack of stimulation. Of course, the pain of boredom will always return, but it is not necessarily present just when a thing that one has become desensitized to is present.

Therefore, we can conclude that boredom has two distinct components: (i) habituation, and (ii) suffering. We return to Proposition 1:

Proposition 1: Boredom is omnipresent in the sense that all things progressively become boring with time, or else already start off so.

When we say all things become boring with time, we are referring to the power of boredom to habituate us to said things, not the power of boredom to make us suffer. Now, as these two things are nearly always co-extensive, this point can be hard to pin down. However, this important caveat allows us to more accurately present Proposition 1 as Proposition 2:

Proposition 2: Habituation is omnipresent in the sense that all things progressively become habituated to with time, or else already start off so.

§15. I’m sure the path forward has now become clear. To deal with the suffering left in boredom’s wake, we must habituate to it. This is how we can transcend boredom, even given its omnipresent status. The result will be neutrality without suffering. As we have a duty to negate suffering, but not neutrality, we ought habituate to boredom.

Leopardi realized this truth to a degree. He wrote about ‘Patience’ in his Zibaldone (commonplace book) and Letters. However, because of the nature of these writings, he never published anything on the subject, and so may not have come to either an acceptance or refutation of this idea. I mention this for the reason that, if one reads the sources in which Leopardi writes on this topic, they will find that he often jumps back and forth between the ideas that (iii) patience is necessary in order to reduce human suffering, and (iv) boredom cannot be adapted to, and therefore, life has utterly negative value. Leopardi’s final writings on this issue posit (iii). Similarly, I argue we should accept position (iii) and reject position (iv).

§16. As the discussion about patience has been quite abstract so far, I will lay out a few concrete mentions:

“Habituation will alleviate any ill, and with enough practice, man can become accustomed to absolute, total boredom. I myself am proof of this. At first, boredom drove me to despair, but then, as it increased instead of diminishing, habit, little by little, made it less frightening to me and more susceptible to patience. My patience with boredom finally became really heroic. The example of prisoners, who sometimes have even grown to like that life.”

• Zibaldone [280]

“Being tired of waging war against the inevitable, I let rest take the place of happiness, from habit I’ve grown accustomed to tedium, which I thought I could never get used to, and have almost finished suffering.”

• Letter 57

Moses the Black on attempting to negate acedia through stimulation:

“You have not freed yourself from it, but rather have given yourself up to it as its slave and subject. For the enemy will henceforth attack you more strongly as a deserter and runaway, since it has seen that you fled at once when overcome in the conflict: unless on a second occasion when you join battle with it you make up your mind not to dispel its attacks and heats for the moment by deserting your cell, or by the inactivity of sleep, but rather learn to triumph over it by endurance and conflict.”

And Russell again:

“The kind of boredom which the person accustomed to drugs experiences when deprived of them is something for which I can suggest no remedy except time.”

With exposure to boredom, one can negate it up until the point where neutrality no longer seems a daunting and bleak state; a sort of mithridatism. We often associate neutrality with boredom because of the fact that the former rises up when not temporarily suppressed by some pleasure or pain, but in fact, neutrality must be a state free from all negative connotations. As Mill says: ‘With much tranquility, many find that they can be content with very little pleasure.’[23] If neutrality is not free of all negative connotations, then it is not really neutrality at all, but some form of suffering.

One may label the idea of simply sitting alone in one’s room as a boring one, but the true secret to life is being able to view such a situation without the least thought of anything negative. Sages, monks, scholars, etc., have long exemplified this skill through contemplation, stillness, and solitude. These should be our models for patience, and we should often reflect on their way(s) of life.

Cultivating patience also has the benefit of weakening our egoism. As our opposition to boredom wanes, so too will our ‘desire’ for pleasure.

Patience also gives us ‘new eyes’ as Proust would put it. Stepping back from the world of constant stimulation makes those things which we usually fail to notice appear all the more beautiful. This applies to the other sense faculties as well.

§17. While our critique of pleasure started off bleak, with us positing an omnipresent boredom as the necessary consequence, we were able to find a line of thought which instead allows us to achieve peace and serenity.

§18. The discovery of this essay is the negation of boredom through the cultivation of patience. We ought pursue neutrality, rather than chasing pleasure. Life is about (a) finding peace and (b) helping others to do likewise. Of course, suffering is not compatible with peace.

§19. Chasing pleasure leaves us numb in the end, and we must come to be familiar with boredom in order to rid ourselves of its power over us. This does not require ubiquitous exposure to states with little or no stimulation, but exposure to these states should certainly be a regular occurrence for us. Sitting with our own boredom, and then with our tranquility keeps our egoism and desire in check.

Notes

[1] Hypothetical: If (a.) only God can fill the abyss, and if (b.) there is no God, then (c.) the abyss cannot be filled; hence boredom is omnipresent.

[2] Utilitarianism.

1. Epistemology & Metaphysics

2. Ethical Definitions & Axioms

3. Suffering

4. Good-Will

Appendix: World-Exploders

Notes

Book I: Epistemology & Metaphysics

§1. There exist natural facts, along with non-natural facts. Natural facts are those which we analyze within the natural sciences, and are about the physical world. Natural properties are those which physically exist in the universe, and can be observed. These include ‘being a mountain’, ‘being a shirt’, ‘being an atom’, ‘being red’, ‘being wet’, etc. Natural facts are exclusively about natural properties. We learn about natural properties and their facts empirically. Empiricism is the method of gaining and verifying knowledge through observation, in which we utilize our sensory experiences and the scientific method. We first put forward prima facie facts as conjectures, and then attempt to falsify these conjectures in the world. We may empirically learn the natural facts that ‘Jim’s shirt is red today’, or ‘Mt. Everest’s peak is about 29,032 feet above sea level’. We can also infer some natural facts. For example, given the fact that I see a glass of water, I can infer that a great number of H₂O molecules are present.

Non-Natural facts are facts which do not conform to this category. These facts are not about the physical world, although their truths do apply there. The facts that ‘there are infinitely many prime numbers’, ‘squares cannot have 3 sides’, ‘7+2=9’, and ‘p → q, p ∴ q is valid’ are non-natural facts. Non-Natural properties are abstract, and we learn their facts rationally. Rationalism is the method of gaining knowledge through totally impartial reflection.[1] This means that we learn these facts through thinking about their concepts and the relations of these concepts accurately, and inferring their truth.[3] To put it differently, we come to ‘get’, or ‘understand’ these facts.[2] Take the mathematical concept of division. If we understand division, then we can infer the fact that two goes into four, two times, evenly. If we understand the concept of thinking, we can infer the fact that it requires (and hence implies) existing. Non-Natural facts must involve at least one non-natural property.

We may find individual instances of non-natural facts through empirical observation, or may come to first know of them in this way. For example, we may see putting these two rocks next to these other two rocks leaves us with four of these rocks in total. However, we couldn’t infer the non-natural fact that ‘2+2=4’ for all possible objects abstractly and necessarily from these empirical observations alone.

§2. Non-Natural facts are necessary, which means they obtain in all possible worlds. This allows us to learn they are false if they do not obtain in even a single possible world. For example, although the Detroit Pistons won the NBA Championship in 2004, we could imagine a possible world in which a different team completed this feat. Therefore, ‘the Detroit Pistons were the 2004 NBA Champions’ does not apply in all possible worlds, and is not a necessary fact. However, ‘two is the only even prime number’ is necessarily true, as we could not imagine a world in which this fact did not obtain, given we understand all of the concepts involved. The fact that the sum of 2 and 2 is 4 is also necessary. We cannot imagine a world in which the sum of 2 and 2 was 3, given we understood all of the concepts involved, and their relations.

Because any potential non-natural fact that does not obtain in all possible worlds is false, we would all agree about these facts if we rationally deliberated on their related concepts equally accurately. In other words, our thought would converge, as it does with logical and mathematical facts, and we would all agree on these facts.[4] We test non-natural facts using thought experiments. These facts demonstrate their rigor when they resist falsification under extreme thought experiments. Impartiality is an intellectual virtue when deliberating over necessary truths.

§3. Some facts are ‘self-evident’ in that they are impossible to deny, and are immediately-inferred. For example, (a) cogito, and (b) a whole is greater than or equal to any of its parts. These truths are understood, but not deduced. Given that immediate-inferences are a type of inference - step in reasoning (albeit the first step) - I will drop ‘immediately’ hereafter, and use ‘inference’ to refer to both deduced and immediate inferences.

§4. Of non-natural facts, there are two categories. The first is Formal, which is composed of mathematical and logical facts. Some examples were given above, but another example of a logical fact would be ‘P cannot be true and false simultaneously’. This is the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). This fact can also be stated as ‘Truth and falsity are mutually exclusive’, in the sense that the properties of ‘being true’ and ‘being false’ cannot apply to the same proposition, at the same time. We do not discover this fact empirically through observation, but come to infer it through rational reflection on the concepts involved, and their relations.[5]

The other category of non-natural facts is the Moral or Ethical. Moral facts count against actions. A potential moral fact could be: ‘there is a duty to do x’ or ‘not doing x would be wrong’. These facts cannot be natural, as (a) we cannot find these facts through sense-data, observation, or measurement, but come to infer (and reject) them rationally, and can then adhere to them in the physical world if we so choose, and (b) Unconditionality: these facts must be necessary (for example, if ‘x’ is wrong in-itself in Situation-A, it must also be wrong in Situation-B, unless there exist relevant differences between them other than the fact that they are simply two different scenarios).[6] This is also Total Impartiality, insofar as you favor no part of a scenario: time, space, humanity, the globe, nor any other factors above any others without justification. Many people would accept the moral fact that ‘there is a duty to not knowingly cause innocent people to severely suffer’, although I am not asking anyone to accept this fact at this point in time.

§5. It has been famously and correctly stated that we cannot derive an ought from an is. All attempts to reduce moral properties to non-moral ones fail because they end in tautology. For example, if ‘being what is right’ is just ‘being what the majority votes for’, then when you state: ‘what the majority votes for is right’, you are really stating the non-moral natural fact: ‘what the majority votes for is what the majority votes for’, or the non-natural moral fact: ‘what is right is right’. You may as well have said nothing at all.

Although moral properties such as ‘being wrong’ or ‘being a duty’ cannot be, or be reduced to non-moral properties such as ‘being wet’, ‘being dark’, ‘being loud’, or ‘being even’, they can be related in certain ways. When we say ‘x is wrong’, for example, ‘being x’ could be a non-moral property, and ‘being wrong’ a moral one; these properties may just apply to the same act, rather than reducing into each other. We call this being co-extensive. The natural property of being Jim’s shirt is co-extensive with the natural property of being red on those days Jim chooses to wear a red shirt. If two properties must always apply to the same concept, they are necessarily co-extensive. The number 2 is the smallest prime number, insofar as the properties of ‘being the number two’ and ‘being the smallest prime number’ are necessarily co-extensive; likewise with ‘being the sum of seven and five’ and ‘being twelve’. These properties will always denote the same object; however, the property of ‘being the number two’ is not identical or reducible to the property of ‘being the smallest prime number’; the same with ‘being the sum of seven and five’ and ‘being the number twelve’. We know these must be different properties, because one is not found in the concept of the other. On the other hand, consider the necessary phrases ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ and ‘all triangles are three-sided polygons’. The properties of ‘being a bachelor’ and ‘being an unmarried man’ are identical, and likewise with ‘being a triangle’ and ‘being a three-sided polygon’. The concept of a bachelor already contains the concept of an ‘unmarried man’, and a ‘triangle’, likewise with ‘three-sided polygon’. These are simply different names for the same concept, and are not in any way co-extensive, as there is no co. These truths are sometimes called analytic or definitional truths and are tautological and necessary. In order to be necessarily co-extensive, at least two different concepts must be involved. Truths which meet this criterion of multiple concepts are called synthetic truths.

For moral truths to be substantive, they must be synthetic, else they are tautologies, and insofar as moral facts are non-natural, if moral properties are co-extensive with some non-moral properties, they must be necessarily so. People may posit the synthetic moral truth that ‘being an act that knowingly causes innocent people severe agony’ and ‘being an act which there is a duty not to do’ are necessarily co-extensive, and state this as: ‘there is a duty not to knowingly cause innocent people severe agony’. Once again, I am not asking for any acceptance of this truth at this time.

§6. Non-Moral facts are descriptive, and often give us reasons; whereas moral facts are prescriptive, and refer to duties. Moral facts are sui generis in their prescriptiveness.

Book II: Definitions & Axioms

§1.

(A.) The Categorical Imperative: I ought never to act except in such a way that I couldn’t also imagine that my maxim would be rationally rejectable in even a single possible scenario.[7]

(B.) A duty is the irreducible moral concept. Duties are non-natural facts which count against not doing some action - even if such an action is an abstention - which is to say totally impartial laws. Duties are grounded in maxims which survive the Categorical Imperative. It is bad if duties are not fulfilled. It is good if duties are fulfilled. We can be unaware of duties.[8]

(C.) A good-will is a will that acts from duty. It is right to have a good-will, and you ought do so.

(D.) Transgression consists in knowingly acting contrary to duty. Transgressing is wrong, and you ought-not do so.

§2. Assume for the moment that dying was bad. If a tree naturally fell on me and killed me, this would be bad; it would not be wrong however. If this tree were going to fall on me and kill me, I would have a duty to move out of the way, which was derived from my duty not to die, which was here hypothetically derived from the categorical imperative. In other words, the fact that a falling tree would kill me if I did not move, counts against my doing that, and therefore it would be bad if I didn’t move. If I knew these facts, and failed to attempt to act in this way, I would be acting wrongly, and hence transgressing my duty. I ought move out of the way, and ought-not stand still. It is irrelevant whether or not I would be motivated to act on my knowledge of such facts.

§3. By ‘know’, I mean ‘expectably-believe’. Based on the facts the agent has a grasp on, what could they expectably-believe would occur? I could not expectably-believe, for example, that my punching you in the face would not harm you; even if, unbeknownst to me, a sniper were going to kill me, stopping my punch just before I made contact with your face. If we assume for the sake of argument that harming others is wrong, then my choice of action to attempt to punch you would, in this case, be wrong, but not bad, as I acted in a way which expectably-transgressed my duty, but no harm actually occurred. Similarly, if I attempted to save you from being run over by a train, but in the process unknowingly caused your children to be tortured by doing so - due to breaking some agreement you had made with a deranged serial killer - my act would be right, but bad.

Because you cannot with full certainty know the consequences of an action when it is willed or initiated, wrongness and rightness, and therefore what one ought do, must be dependent on the expectable-chance for an agent of successfully bringing-about some maxim (subjective principle of the will), given the facts they are in possession of, and must be therefore somewhat probabilistic. On the other hand, duty, and hence goodness and badness, are determined by the facts about the actual-consequence(s) of some action or event. Therefore, you can know an action is right or wrong immediately - given you know the maxim acted upon and the knowledge of the agent - but not be able to discern its badness until the consequences of said action have actually occurred.

From this it follows that ignorance can lead to coincidental good and bad acts, which are neither right nor wrong. For example, a baby may destroy a priceless artifact, or a lumberjack may chop down a tree, unknowingly leading to a malevolent dictator’s death. Knowledge is required in order to act from duty or to transgress it, and hence to act rightly or wrongly.[9]

Imagine a piece of mail. There is an objective answer to when this piece of mail will arrive at its destination once sent. Along with this, at the moment of sending, we can predict when the mail will expectably-arrive; and better-so with knowledge of the relevant facts. In the first sense, the mail arriving is a fact/event, whereas in the second, it is only a maxim, insofar as the arrival has not yet occurred. Next, imagine three scenarios in which I take as my maxim to send a piece of mail to a specific location. Imagine there are three methods which I see as possibilities for this maxim. I know option-one has no expectable-chance of success, the second has a 90% expectable-chance of success, and the third has a 95% expectable-chance of success. Although my maxim is the same in all three scenarios, clearly, the latter two are more likely to realize this maxim as compared to the first, and the third similarly to the second. The same holds when the maxim is moral rather than morally neutral, with the difference being that we can say we ‘ought’ pursue the option most likely to fulfill our maxim in these moral cases. In fact, it may be claimed that only by choosing to pursue the scenario with the highest likelihood of successfully ensuring your maxim, can you actually hold to said maxim, and act rightly.[10] One could not hold as their maxim to win a race for example, while at the same time choosing to pursue a path of action which expectably-decreased their chances of winning, even if only slightly. Similarly, if you knowingly chose the second worst of three options in a moral dilemma, you have acted wrongly, even if not as wrongly as possible.

In the special type of case mentioned above, in which you know the chance of completing some maxim is zero, you cannot successfully will said maxim. This is often denoted as ‘ought implies can’, and Kant calls these contradictions in conception (although he applies it in his incorrect selective way). These cases are important because they fail to disprove necessary moral facts, although they may seem to at first sight. For example, if a possible world existed in which an agent knew it was impossible to cut all of the heads off of a Hydra, this world could not be used to reject the maxim: ‘cut all the heads off of Hydras’, insofar as the agent cannot be said to act from this maxim, if they at the same time know its pursuit to be futile. Similarly, a world in which only one person and rocks exist cannot be used to reject ‘don’t lie to others’, as no others to lie to exist. To refute a maxim, one must use a possible world in which one could successfully carry out said maxim; else maxims could be defined away.

§4. Acts and events may be deontically-neutral, insofar as they ground no duties, and acts may be epistemically-neutral, insofar as we are unaware of the morally relevant facts about these acts. All acts towards those who are not part of the moral circle, given these acts affect only them, do not instantiate duty, and therefore are neutral. Qualifications for membership within the moral circle will be discussed in the following book.

To take some unobjectionable neutral examples, first imagine the act of someone raising their left hand and this having no consequences. This act would be deontically-neutral. Similarly, if one assumes that rocks are not a member of the moral circle for the time being, then one can say that all actions affecting exclusively rocks are deontically-neutral. If some preventable badness were occurring inside of a concrete bunker, which I was unaware of, and I failed to prevent or stop this badness, this would be epistemically-neutral.

A final thing to note on neutrality is that (a) choices between equally valuable moral options are morally undetermined in the sense that there is no duty to choose one over another, and (b) all morally neutral acts are equally morally valuable (insofar as they are equal to nothing), therefore (c) choices between morally neutral acts are morally undetermined. This implies that you never act rightly or wrongly when making choices of this kind.

§5. Acting from duty is necessary for rightness, insofar as a lumberjack chopping down a tree, unknowingly leading to a malevolent dictator’s death, would neither be acting rightly nor wrongly. Their act would likely be good, but to give responsibility to an ignorant agent is absurd.

Imagine next that the lumberjack knew he would kill a malevolent dictator by chopping down said tree, but only did so in order to sell pieces of his body and uniform for large sums of money, which he was not in desperate need of. Here, the man knowingly killed an evil dictator; however, it would still be inappropriate to assign rightness and justified praise to this man’s action, as he took as his maxim: ‘benefit myself financially, even if it requires killing others’, which is clearly not impartially unrejectable. He could just as easily have coincidentally acted according to duty by following any other maxim which was not grounded in duty whatsoever.

Agents often act according to duty in order to avoid punishment or seek praise and gratitude. For example, someone may follow a norm which prohibits some immoral action, only insofar as they wish to avoid some punishment stemming from breaking the norm, and not out of any recognition of the truth of said action’s immorality. Reductions of suffering which come from actions of this type are also among those which are often good, but never right. As Kant says, acts willed according to duty rather than from duty lack any ‘moral worth’. This for the similar reason that, given punishments change, or sources of praise do likewise, goodness may cease.

§6. The following book will attempt to identify which maxims survive the categorical imperative. In order to go about this more simply, it will hereafter be assumed - unless explicitly stated otherwise - that all morally relevant facts are known to all agents involved, therefore collapsing the bad-wrong distinction. To think of it in another way, we will focus on what would be wrong if all of the morally relevant facts were known to all agents.

NOTE - I often borrow Kant’s terminology because I find it to be the best fit for the concepts I am trying to explain. I do not claim to always directly import his thoughts, however. I use these terms in the ways described above, and Kant may use them slightly differently. When troubled with a contradiction or difference between our definitions, forget Kant’s thought and default to mine (although I hope this doesn’t occur often). To give just one example, Kant famously stated:

“It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.”

However, he should have said:

“It is impossible to think of any act at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered right without limitation except that which came from a good will.”

Book III: Suffering

§1. Acts are wrong insofar as they are knowingly willed contrary to duty. The facts about these acts determine the correct choices to make with regard to them. If one act is worse than another, this implies that we have a stronger duty to negate it compared to said other. By ‘negation’ I mean avoidance, reduction, abolition, abstention, and/or prevention. The least conceivable wrongness generates a weak duty to focus on negating itself, while the greatest conceivable wrongness is much worse, and there is an incredibly strong duty to negate it. If we were to assume that suffering were bad, for example, we could conclude that torture would be much worse than a pinch, and that there would be a much stronger duty to negate torture as compared to pinching. Take the following thought experiment:

Suffering: Imagine that at Time 1 you are not suffering, and at Time 2 you are in a state of agony.

The substantive question here is: is there a duty to negate any existent properties at either Time 1 or Time 2? It is important to remember here that regardless of whether anyone is around to negate it or not, if the suffering exists, then the duty would still exist, if we came to accept suffering as duty-generating.

At time 1, you are in a neutral state, and no duty exists. I hardly think this could be objected to. Now jump to time 2; does the fact that you are in a state of agony ‘count against not’ negating this agony? The answer seems to be: yes. To put it another way, if given the choice, choosing to exist in a state identical to that of time 2 rather than that of time 1 would be the wrong choice; it would be transgression, insofar as the facts seem to clearly count against this choice. Next, imagine:

Torture Chamber: You awaken in a near-empty room with two doors: A and B. A voice truthfully tells you that through door A is an exit, and through door B is a torture chamber, in which you will be tortured if you enter. The voice also tells you that you must choose to pass through one of the doors, and that if you do not make a choice, you will be forced through door B.

The facts in this case seem to count against not going through door A, meaning that it seems you ought go through door A. Any other course of action would be the wrong choice. Non-cognitivists would here be forced to claim that no objective, special relationship exists between the facts you know about door B, and the superiority of choosing door A, which seems an absurd conclusion.

The underlying maxim of these prima facie conclusions could be: ‘negate suffering if it exists’.[11] The corresponding fact would be ‘there is a duty to negate suffering, in-itself, if it exists’. In order to test this maxim, we must run it through extreme thought experiments and see if it always survives, as moral facts must be necessary. As it was once beautifully put: ‘How should we explain in accordance with duty so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?’[12]

§2. To give an example of the methodology that will follow, let us look at two examples involving different maxims. First: ‘don’t lie’ (‘you ought-not lie’). Most of us would agree that lying is often wrong. Can we however imagine a possible scenario in which this maxim is rationally rejectable; in other words, where it wouldn’t apply impartially? I would argue that there are a plethora of such cases. Some examples include my lying to you about who will be at some surprise party for yourself, or my lying to you or others in order to save your lives. Given that this maxim fails in some possible scenarios, we can deduce that it is not a necessary moral fact, but only an occasionally contingent truth instead. Lying may be either right, wrong, or neutral, depending on the situation, and there is therefore no duty to tell the truth. While we often ought adopt veracity, it must be for a different reason than the rightness of truth-telling per se.

Note that if telling one lie could be justified only in pursuit of not telling some other lie, then the maxim: ‘don’t lie’ would not be defeated by this case. This is not the case here, but this applies to other possible maxims as well.

Second, maxims which rest on subjectivity or contingency, such as: ‘follow the law’, ‘do what the majority wants’, ‘do what you desire’, ‘follow God’s imperatives’, or ‘keep your promises’. Of course, because the law could say anything, the majority could want anything, you could desire anything, God could order anything,[13] and you could promise anything; if anything could be wrong, such a thing would not be condemned by such a maxim. Maxims of this type must therefore necessarily fail. These are among the clearest examples of how emotionless rational reflection alone can appraise possible moral maxims.

§3. Back to our suffering-based maxim, can we imagine a possible situation in which we ought choose to be in a state of agony over being in a state of no, or lesser agony? I would here argue: no. Although some scenarios seem to allow for suffering, they only do so insofar as they negate a greater suffering. I ought study in order not to fail my test, I ought exercise in order to maintain my health, I ought work in order to afford food and shelter, etc., etc. Some possible worlds may contain no suffering, or even no beings who could suffer; however, any world which did contain beings who could suffer, and did so, would be a world worse than the former options. The fact that our duty would be extremely weak in some of these cases is irrelevant. It is also irrelevant that there may be no other beings around to fulfill these duties, or that if they exist they may be unaware of them.

Parfit notes: ‘When we remember what it’s like to suffer, what we remember counts in favor of our avoiding this state.’ Parfit is not simply stating that suffering feels bad, or seems bad irrationally in the moment, but instead that upon rational reflection - ‘sitting down in a cool hour’ - we realize that suffering is the kind of thing which we ought avoid if possible, as a different, additional fact from the fact that suffering is simply present. Negating suffering is a duty, similarly to how the number seventeen is odd. Seventeen is odd because it is not evenly divisible into two equal parts, and negating suffering is a duty because the facts count against not doing so.

Some judgments do not function like this. For example, I personally have a deep dislike of tomatoes; however, I could not claim that over and above this fact, exists another, different fact which necessarily counts against tomatoes, and therefore tells me I ought dislike them (for of course, I could imagine a possible world in which the maxim: ‘dislike tomatoes’ was rationally rejectable; even if anyone I ever knew of also disliked tomatoes). For example, imagine two people: White and Black. White has her brain rewired, so that, although she can still suffer, she has an unrelenting desire and preference to saw off each of her fingers. Black’s brain on the other hand is rewired to make her have an unrelenting desire, liking, and preference for tomatoes. While both of these people’s desires and preferences are facts, White is in such a situation where we can clearly see that there is an additional fact that she ought resist these desires, if possible, whereas the same cannot be said of Black.

§4. We can also test this maxim in other ways. One is by comparing our duties against each other. For example, Imagine:

Torture Chamber II: You awaken in a near-empty room with two doors: A and B. A voice truthfully tells you that through door A is a torture chamber, in which you will be mildly electrically shocked, and through door B is a torture chamber, in which you will be slowly flayed alive. The voice also tells you that you must choose to pass through one of the doors, and that if you do not make a choice, you will be forced through door B.

In such a case, you would have a duty to choose door A in order not to be slowly flayed alive. However, you would also have a duty to choose door B in order not to be electrically shocked. It seems clear here that although we have a pro tanto duty to choose each of the doors, our duty to choose door A is significantly stronger than our duty to choose door B, and we therefore have an absolute duty to choose door A. This is the conclusion we would expect to come to if suffering were duty-generating: that stronger sufferings would generate stronger duties than weaker ones, or in other words, would be more objectionable.[14] This allows us to refine our maxim in order to stay in line with our thought experiments: ‘negate suffering if it exists, prioritizing stronger sufferings over weaker ones’. Our moral fact becomes: there is a duty to negate suffering if it exists, with the strengths of such duties supervening[15] on the strengths of such sufferings.

§5. Another way in which we can test this fact is by seeing if it subsumes other moral truths. This would imply that actions which fail to negate some property other than suffering are only instrumentally wrong. For example, it is wrong to stick one’s hand into a fire, not because there is a duty not to stick one’s hand into fires, but because there is a duty to negate suffering. If one stuck one’s hand into a fire and did not suffer, this wouldn’t be wrong, and it certainly would not be wrong in all possible scenarios. One may appeal to the damage and death this fire may or would cause to attempt to prove this action’s wrongness. These themselves are only anointed with wrongness because of the suffering they are associated with, however. Some imaginary rock-like creature may painlessly stick his hands into fire, or even have a reason for doing so, or a derived duty to do so.

Autonomy or non-contradiction with another’s consent are also often taken to be duties. Can we however, imagine a situation in which contradicting another’s consent is not rationally rejectable? Imagine I saw you attempting to stick your hand into a fire, which would cause you great suffering. I ask you why, and you say you are curious about how it feels. I tell you not to do this, but you refuse and tell me not to stop you. Although my stopping you would be a non-consensual act towards you, it is what I ought do. Some may argue that I ought not stop you insofar as you won’t learn not to repeat this action or similar ones otherwise; but of course I could imagine a possible world in which you learn this truth through some other method, such as recounting the experiences of others, or understanding the concepts involved through being taught, etc. Some may also object that a desire to stick one’s hand into a fire would not occur if one was in their right mind. Of course we can imagine a possible world however, in which the inhabitants naturally have this desire, though it still causes them great agony. We ought still stop these beings if able.

Given that we can imagine a case in which contradicting another’s consent is not rejectable, we can reject ‘one ought-not to contradict another’s consent’ as a duty, or unconditional law. This does not mean that acts which contradict another’s consent are not often wrong; only that they are wrong for a different reason than the contradiction of consent per se. Of course, I personally posit suffering as this reason. For example, if I coerce you to maim someone for me, this would be wrong, insofar as it causes suffering; but if I coerce you to not maim someone whom you planned on maiming, this would not be so, as it causes no suffering, and in fact reduces it (and this even if the maimed desired such an act, given it still caused him agony).

Similarly, imagine three distinct lies. Green lies to his wife insofar as he is secretly unfaithful to her; Yellow lies to his wife insofar as he has secretly been stealing her candy bars; and Orange lies to his wife insofar as he knows informing her of some secret information would lead to her death. It seems obvious here that (1) Orange does not act wrongly, as he causes no suffering, and (2) Green’s lie is worse than Yellow’s, as discovering a partner cheating is bound to cause much greater suffering than discovering a partner stealing your candy bars.

This will be the end result of all valid chains of reasoning involving duty: Only facts about suffering give us duties. Stated in a slightly different way, we can say that all properties proposed to be necessarily co-extensive with duty other than suffering, can either be shown to actually be based upon and reducible to suffering, or discarded as irrational in a reductio ad absurdum using the categorical imperative, as was done with a few examples above. On the other hand, suffering’s badness being a necessary fact means that the assumption of this fact’s negation is a reductio ad absurdum itself. Of course, it is impossible to go through and work out all possible sources of duty to suffering or absurdity, given there is a potentially infinite amount of them, but I will mention a few here quickly, and the rest can be worked through over time in thought experiments. One method which often works is simply imagining that the cost of carrying out your maxim is the torture of some innocent person, although to cover all cases more creativity is needed.

Why is the virtue of moderation praised? Insofar as both deprivation and gluttony lead to suffering. Why is the virtue of foresight praised? Insofar as it prevents us from unknowingly stumbling into contact with suffering. What value comes from the famous aphorism: ‘That which does not kill us makes us stronger.’? It comforts us with the idea that our endurance of suffering will weaken suffering’s sting on us in the future. How about: ‘Do not worry about things which you cannot control.’? It lays out the truth that if you cannot through action, reduce the suffering which will come from some event, then you cannot meaningfully alter said event, and as ought implies can, have no reason to worry over it (which causes suffering), etc., etc. Similarly, it seems that some properties are clearly not candidates for being dutiful whatsoever. The number of fingers, toes, limbs, the color of one’s hair or fur, the size of a being, etc., seem to hold no connection to morality in the slightest, and can therefore be excluded from the candidacy list. I believe most properties we know of fall under this category, making our job much easier (although it never hurts to test these maxims if you are unsure).

One significant property within the history of philosophy has been pleasure. However, it is not difficult at all to imagine someone who acts contrary to the maxim ‘pursue pleasure’, whom does not act wrongly. Imagine on Monday, Violet tries some pill for the first time and experiences intense pleasure, with no side effects or suffering. If Violet had the ability to take the pill on Tuesday, in a near-identical situation, would they be acting wrongly if they chose not to do so? There seems to be no reason that this would be the case. I suspect most people would agree. Although it would be permissible to engage in taking this pill on Tuesday, it would not be morally required, and hence, would not be a duty; therefore the pleasure-seeking maxim fails. Attempts to refine this maxim will similarly fail.

§6. Another way in which we can test this fact is by seeing if it is universal, insofar as it applies to all others with the capacity-to-suffer. Assuming you are an average human, we know that you will experience great agony if you stick your hand into a fire. When you stick your hand into said fire, you have a subjective experience of suffering. However, the fact of the suffering’s existence is not subjective, just the particular experience of it that you are privy to.

The fact that this act instantiates the natural property of being an act that causes suffering makes this act have the different non-natural, moral property, of being an act that there is a duty to negate. There is no reason this would be any different for other beings with the capacity-to-suffer, or differ in strength for them, given simply your being different individuals, with no other morally relevant differences present. The law must be applied impartially. Therefore, your duty to prevent my being burned at the stake would be equivalent in strength to mine towards you, and both of ours towards ourselves, given we were in equal positions to accomplish this prevention of suffering. This may not seem immediately apparent, but it will become so after rational reflection on the facts. Consider:

Magical Room: Imagine you awaken in some near-empty room. A voice tells you that unless you press some button to your left, a stranger will begin to suffer intense agony, and unless you press some button on your right, you will begin to suffer intense agony. You can only press one of the buttons.

In such a case, you would have an equally strong duty to press either of the buttons. You would also have a duty not to press neither of the buttons. It may be argued that you have a stronger duty to save yourself from agony rather than the stranger; however, I see no justification for this assumption. You may have a stronger preference or desire to save yourself, but so may the stranger for himself, leading back to equality (and of course a stranger to both of you would see no duty to press one of the buttons over the other). Besides, ethics is not based on desires and preferences, but facts. The fact of the matter is that if the strength of the sufferings will be equal, then the strength of the duties will be equal.[16] The burden of proof lies on the side of those who posit prudential (self-centered) duties to prove why these must be their own distinct concept, and not an arbitrary moral category. They may attempt to prove this by relying on man’s egoism, or his stronger preferences and motivations towards himself and those he is most concerned with; this fails the criterion of objectivity, necessity, and impartiality however, as mentioned above.

Some may argue that we have a stronger duty towards ourselves as compared to others, insofar as we are often in a better position to deal with our own sufferings as compared to those of others. While this is often true, it is only contingently true, and not necessarily true in-itself. The example given just above, for example, shows a case in which we are not in a situation where the negation of our own suffering is any easier or more direct than that of another. Given it is not necessarily true that we ought value ourselves over others, we can reject this as a moral fact.

Imagine I knew that you and I were equally likely to be correct about some argument. Now, imagine I claimed that, because I crafted my argument, and you crafted yours, I have a stronger reason to accept my argument over yours. This would be absurd. I wouldn’t be going against the facts by accepting my argument instead of yours, as they are equally valid; however, I could not say that the facts made my argument more likely to be true, as I know our arguments are equally likely to be so. I would be just as justified by the facts to accept your argument, although, similarly, I could not claim that it was more likely to be true. Given I have equal reason to accept either argument, it would be dishonest for me to claim that prudentially I ought to accept my own.

As with choices between neutral acts, in situations where you must choose between equivalent sufferings affecting different individuals, any choice is as good as any other.

§7. Another way to test this maxim, which was just briefly touched upon, is to look for objectivity. There is a duty to negate suffering in the objective sense that it is object-based, as Parfit would put it, insofar as duty is based on the ‘object of suffering’, rather than the subjective motivational-sets or preferences of individuals. Consider:

Magical Room II: Imagine you awaken in some near-empty room. A voice tells you that unless you press some button in front of you, a stranger will begin to suffer intense agony. You are ignorant of this stranger’s preferences and desires, and you are not motivated to press the button.

In such a situation, you would still have a duty to press the button, even given your lack of knowledge about the stranger, and lack of motivation to do so. This is because what exists is not your duty, but the duty; not only you, but nobody could imagine a possible situation in which the underlying maxim of this action was rationally rejectable (at least seemingly within the bounds of our reason, by which we are always limited). You just happen to be in the privileged position of being informed of the relevant facts. Note that I do not mean ‘not motivated’ in the sense that you literally ‘couldn’t’ press the button due to lack of motivation, only that you do not have any inclination to act in this way.

It has now been widely and correctly accepted that one can know something is wrong and be motivated to or prefer to do said thing anyway, or know something is right and fail to be motivated or prefer to do said thing anyway. It should come as no surprise then, that an agent’s motivational set and preferences are irrelevant, and in fact often a distorting influence, when reflecting on what there is a duty to do. Consider:

Dog Medicine: Imagine some dog is motivated not to take some pill, but will suffer great agony if it does not take said pill.

The dog has a duty to take the pill, even if it lacks the capacity to recognize it. Although the dog may have a competing pro tanto duty not to take the pill (bad taste), it is outweighed by the pro tanto duty to take it (agony). Most of us have this realization when we struggle to feed our pets pills. We wish we could explain to the pet that ‘it is for their own good’. What we mean by this is that there is an absolute duty to take the pill, insofar as the facts count against the pet not taking the pill. The dog just happens to be unaware of these facts, and motivated to act contrary to them.

Another problem with accepting a subjective approach to ethics was given by Parfit. Under a subjectivist framework, I could pose a thought experiment as such:

Bucket: In 2 years time, a man will stick his hand into a bucket of molten lead, causing him extreme agony.

A subjectivist could not claim that this act would be wrong, if they were unaware of what the man’s desires and preferences would be in two years time. The man could fall and injure his head in such a way that he desires to stick his hand into the bucket at the time of the event. They must therefore suspend judgment on this act. An objectivist has no such problem however. Given the fact is known that unnecessary agony will occur from this action, an objectivist could state that this action will be wrong, even if this statement is made two years before the action occurs, and even if the man undergoes some injury, making him desire to stick his hand into the bucket.

§8. I believe that these tests together prove that it is a necessary moral fact that: there is a duty to negate suffering if it exists, with the strengths of such duties supervening on the strengths of such sufferings. Unlike with lying, or non-contradiction with consent, I cannot, after hours and days of imagination and reflection, come up with a possible scenario in which it’s rejectable to negate suffering, given this negation will not lead to some other, greater suffering. Any justification I can think of for not coming to the aid of another, or for harming another, is grounded in some other, equivalent or stronger suffering, and therefore in suffering itself, if not in the impossibility of negation. From this, I must accept that myself and others often act wrongly; but this is a sad conclusion, rather than an argument against a moral theory. Where my reason contradicts my inclination to laziness, selfishness, and everydayness, I must favor the former.

This fact does not claim that it is always wrong to cause suffering, but that it is always wrong to cause more suffering than necessary. Imagine a kindly man was going to sit on a nuclear launch button aimed at some major city, unbeknownst to him. Given we knew these facts, it would be wrong of us to do nothing rather than push the man out of the way so that he would not sit on the button, even given that pushing him would cause him some slight, or even moderate amount of suffering. Another example is that of disciplining a child. If a child is mean to their classmates or friends, it may be necessary to sternly inform them of the wrongness of their actions or deprive them of some enjoyment, therefore causing them some slight suffering. However, given the fact that without this punishment, their insults would continue, it is morally permissible. It would be slightly bad (as suffering is present), but not wrong. Of course, one could imagine that this got out of hand. Striking a child repeatedly with a belt, for example, would cause the child more suffering than necessary to get the point across (if it is even an effective method of getting said point across), and would hence be wrong.

§9. We see forming a true version of universalism, in which duty is actually universal. The only morally relevant differences between beings are differences in their ‘capacity-to-suffer’. If, for example, we knew that shrimp suffered exactly 50% as intensely as us from the same actions, we could justifiably reduce the strength of their duties in half when weighing them against our own. If they instead suffered equally to us, however, then we must consider them equally. Here, we derive our qualification for membership in the moral circle, which is the ‘capacity-to-suffer’. If one lacked this capacity, nothing could possibly go badly, wrong, or worse for them, other than gaining said capacity.

Here we find another proof of the necessity of suffering’s badness. It seems impossible upon reflection, to imagine a possible scenario being rationally rejectable for one whom does not possess the capacity-to-suffer. Therefore, if one believes that anything is bad, the negation of the truth of the badness of suffering is once again a reductio.

§10. From universalism comes the aforementioned truth that all individuals’ duties are equally strong in morally equivalent situations. If Red is suffering five units, and Blue is suffering likewise, then we can say that there are two instances of five suffering, and therefore, two instances of a duty to negate suffering, based on strength-5. What there is not, however, is any individual suffering ten units, or a duty to negate said suffering based on strength-10. Nor is there even a duty to negate said suffering based on strength-6.[17]

Each individual instance of suffering may be added up within an individual, as they often compound. Such is the case, for example, when an intense migraine, along with having just been fired from one’s job, combine to overwhelm Red more so than they would have if suffered individually. They must be kept separate interpersonally, however (with moral-personhood being a unified, distinct suffering-experience). If the man in the car next to Red, Blue, just spilled his coffee on his lap, leading to him suffering such and such amount, although he feels this, neither of them feels the combination of the migraine + firing + coffee. Therefore, a duty proportionate to their combined sufferings doesn’t exist. Red’s suffering exists with a duty based on strength x, and Blue’s on strength y, but no duty based on strength x + y exists.

I don’t reject that awareness of another’s suffering can increase our own. This does increase our own suffering, however.

This means that, as far as the ethical calculus is concerned, the variable of the number of individuals involved in some suffering-event (N,n) is irrelevant in-itself, along with any aggregation between individuals. If Red and Blue are suffering together equally, then we have just as much duty to save the two of them as we would to save a different lone individual suffering equally to each of them. Either way, one set[18] of equivalent suffering is occurring, and one is negated.[19] Consider the following thought experiments:

Dilemma 1: You could either save 2 individuals in Room A, suffering 5 and 5 respectively, or 1 individual in Room B suffering 7.

Dilemma 2: You could either save 2 individuals in Room A suffering 8 and 8 respectively, or 2 individuals in Room B suffering 1 and 10 respectively.

In both cases, saving those in Room B is the correct choice. Dilemma 1 covers cases of ‘total’ aggregation, in which the strengths of duties are combined. Although Room A contains 10 suffering, and Room B only contains 7, you ought save Room B. Some may think that this indicates that the average amount of suffering in a suffering-event is the relevant factor, seeing as 5 < 7. However, Dilemma 2 shows that this is not the case. Even though the average for Room A (8) is greater than for Room B (5), you ought to save Room B, insofar as you have the strongest duty to do so.

The relevant factor, as has been recognized by Richard Ryder in his book Painsim, is the Maximum of suffering contained within a suffering-set. For example, given sets x and y, with individuals suffering accordingly:

x = {7, 8, 4, 1, 1, 3}

y = {9, 1, 2}

The only relevant statistic within set-x is max(x), which is 8, and likewise for set-y and 9. Therefore, if we can only stop either set-x or set-y, we ought stop set-y. This follows from the fact that each individual is regarded equally, meaning their individual sufferings must be compared, and the most severe among them is the most severe of the set, and hence the strength of the strongest duty to negate the suffering of the set. Of course, when comparing multiple options, each option should be represented by its strongest duty to be chosen, insofar as this is what there is most absolute duty to do.[20]

It must not be assumed that this means that once we have saved a single suffering-set from say, 9 suffering, we do no more good by saving another individual or set from 9 suffering, or even some lesser suffering. There remains an equivalent duty to save the next individual or set from their suffering, ceteris paribus. Each person you save out of a group of one-hundred is equivalent to each other person, and this effect does not stack, but it also does not nullify. Another way this could be stated, is that in a scenario where multiple people are suffering equally intensely, yet you could only save them one at a time, there is not a duty of strength-x to save one of these people, but rather to save any or each of these people. Of course then, this duty will not just disappear after one individual or set (the first one) has been saved. Consider:

(a.)

• x = {10, 10, 10, 10}

• y = {10}

• max(max(x), max(y)) = 10

• x is negated

• x = ∅

• y = {10}

• max(max(x), max(y)) = 10

(b.)

• x = {10, 10, 10, 10}

• y = {10}

• max(max(x), max(y)) = 10

• y is negated

• x = {10, 10, 10, 10}

• y = ∅

• max(max(x), max(y)) = 10

Because duty is based on Max(), we can see that both before and after set-x’s negation, a duty based on strength 10 is present. The same is true when we negate set-y instead of set-x. Therefore, there is no greater duty to choose either option, (a.) or (b.), over the other, in-themselves. However, upon completion of one of these options, we are left with an equally strong duty to complete the other option, if possible.

This view may seem to leave space open for accusations that those who hold it do not take seriously enough suffering-events with large numbers involved. On the contrary; others wait for the bodies to pile up, and the counts to be completed, before they can decide what the force of their judgment will be. This is clearly absurd. One does not need to wait and see how many people some murderer kills before recognizing the fact that they have acted wrongly, or the severity of the wrongness of their actions. Similarly, the first innocent civilian tortured by some evil despot is worth just as much as the last, and the unfitness of the ruler need not be given time to ‘develop’ or ‘be discovered’, as it is already present.

§11. It is important to note that in real-world applications, saving a greater number is often the right choice to make. This is not true because it is a greater number per se however, but only because of the relationship between this greater number and a greater reduction in suffering, whether intensity or time. To use a rather crass example: killing a single individual with a bomb in a major city would be much less wrong than killing every resident of the city with a much larger bomb. This fact is not made true because 1 < x, however, but because the effects of the entire population of a major city being killed would result in more intense and longer suffering as compared to an individual. To return to the crassness: the financial strain from many people dying would likely be much larger than that from a single individual. Similarly, if I could save each of five people from drowning either (a) at the exact same time, or (b) one by one, such that each additional person spends an additional minute in the water struggling before being saved, (a)’s superiority seems clear.

§12. To briefly deal with probability, we can multiply the expected maximum of suffering by P(x) - insofar as P(x) is based on the expectable-chance of bringing about some maxim, given the facts the moral agent is in possession of - for any action. This has long been known. If we have no chance of successfully completing some action, then our transgression towards this action instantaneously becomes zero, insofar as we multiply the strength of the transgression by zero. For example, imagine I knew that two individuals were suffering: a woman in a secure bunker 500ft underground was being tortured, and a woman right in front of me had fallen and broken her leg. If I knew that it would be impossible for me to reduce the suffering of the first woman in any way, then I would not be acting wrongly at all by focusing exclusively on the second woman; even given the more intense suffering being undergone by woman one. Ought implies can.

§13. Many say that suffering cannot be objectively measured because it is subjectively experienced. This does not follow however. While I admit that two different people may suffer differing amounts from the same act, they will both still suffer some objective amount. This objective amount is the relevant factor in the ethical calculus. On a similar definition of subjective, some people claim that suffering is subjective insofar as it depends on a mind. If this were the case however, then we would be forced to admit that the fact ‘some dogs bark’ is not objective, but subjective, insofar as a dog’s ability to bark is dependent on their having a mind. Because this conclusion is absurd, we can reject this line of reasoning.

§14. Ethicists have tried to justify partiality towards oneself, loved ones, friends, etc, for centuries; however, consider:

Family: Imagine that you could either save your Mother or 5 Strangers from being punched in the face. You have a very deep connection with your mother.

This is the source of Sidgwick’s so-called ‘Profoundest Problem’ of trying to decide what we have most duty to do when some act would be better for me, and another would be better for another or others. There is no ‘problem’ here, however. We have a stronger duty to negate worse suffering. In order to choose to save Mother over another, she must be suffering as badly or worse than they are. In such a case, I either can (given their suffering is equal), or should (given her suffering is greater) save Mother. This allows for some level of partiality to pass by without being marked as transgression.

We can see this when we imagine that instead of ourselves being in this situation, someone who is a stranger to both our mother and the 5 strangers is instead facing this choice. This person would clearly have no duty to save your mother over the five strangers. Similarly, imagine that I had to choose between saving a stranger, or my mother whom I had never met until that moment. Here also, it seems I have no duty to prefer one over the other. Seeing as moral maxims must be based on necessary facts, this falsifies the proposed fact that your mother ought be saved in a situation of this sort.

I see a significant chance that it is the case that choosing to save a stranger over a loved one, for example, will often pain the loved one or the saver to such a degree via betrayal that it allows for small differences in their suffering to be breached. This must be kept in check however. I may never save my mother from stubbing her toe rather than save another from breaking their leg.

Williams argues that, if we treat these cases as such, our relationships with those we favor, such as our romantic partners or family members, will lose much of the meaning and happiness they bring us. This seems to me to be an unfounded assumption. If a mother could not understand your causing her some slight suffering in order to save another from a much greater harm, this would be due to her own egoism and transgression. If she objected to your behavior, she would not be able to point out a reason that it was wrong (which must be related to duty). Our favor alone does not raise someone’s objective moral status, and our inability to accept this truth comes from our own egoism and the enjoyment we find in those close to us.

I do not devalue myself when I recognize others as equivalent to myself. Upon realization of this truth, what occurs is not a collapse of my self-love which would consist of my no longer caring for myself; but instead the elevation of others to my level. I recognize that my duty to save another from some suffering is equivalent to what I would recognize it to be towards myself, were I the one experiencing such a suffering.

§15. One implication of this ethical calculus is the supremacy of the individual, insofar as one individual’s, or even a group’s suffering of quantity ‘x’ cannot outweigh that of another, single individual’s. Our duty to save one individual over another, or even one individual over a group, can be given by the prevalence of their suffering over that of these other individuals. This prevents a ‘tyranny of the majority’ from occurring.

§16. We can say that suffering matters because it is related to duty (through their necessary co-extensivity), unlike with valueless (neutral) states. It has long been held that people ‘matter’ in the sense that they have intrinsic worth. This is not the correct way to think of this concept, however. People ‘matter’ in the sense that they have the potential for us to have a duty towards them. They have this potential because they possess the capacity-to-suffer. What matters is not the people, but their suffering. This is why we can accept that animals also ‘matter’, without getting lost in nonsensical questions such as whether people or animals ‘matter more’. What matters more is only more suffering. A dog does not matter more than a person, nor a person more than a dog. When a person is suffering worse than a dog, their suffering matters more, and vice versa. I believe that people realize something close to this when they state ‘all people matter equally’. They are not claiming everyone is the same or does the same amount of good, but that there is the potential for us to have equivalent duties towards any one of these people, as we would have towards any other in a situation devoid of relevant differences (impartiality).[21] For example, it would be wrong to ever severely torture any being.

§17. We take as a necessary moral fact that: There is a duty to negate suffering if it exists, with the strengths of such duties supervening on the strengths of such sufferings; and we derive from this fact the maxim: Negate suffering if it exists, prioritizing stronger sufferings over weaker ones; and the negative form of this maxim: Never inflict suffering, nor allow it to flourish, less in the prevention of some equivalent or stronger suffering. These maxims are significant because they survive the Categorical Imperative. In other words, it is impossible to imagine a possible scenario in which such maxims would be rationally rejectable, insofar as they could always be applied impartially.

Acts which knowingly cause or fail to prevent suffering are wrong, given they cannot be justified by some other equivalent or greater suffering; and negating our suffering is something there is a duty to do. Being an act that negates our suffering and being an act that there is a duty to do are two necessarily co-extensive properties. The difference between these properties must be kept clear, however. The fact that an act has the property of being an act which negates suffering, makes this act have the different property of being an act which there is a duty to do.

NOTE - It seems likely to me that there is a maximum of possible suffering and duty, which we can call ‘10’, for example. If this is the case, then the answer to the age-old question of ‘What was the worst thing to ever happen?’ would likely have multiple equally valid answers, all of which are at this level.

Book IV: Good-Will

§1. We have a duty to negate suffering, and we have a stronger duty to negate more suffering as compared to less suffering. This duty’s corresponding maxim instructs us to reduce our suffering and others’ as if it were our own, prioritizing those suffering most, as well as not to cause suffering, except for the reason of negating some other equivalent or greater suffering. Holding this maxim of suffering-negation embodies a good-will.

We should look for ways in which we can reduce the major sources of suffering in our own lives; lack of food, shelter, clothing, health, etc., and do likewise to others. Negating our own suffering initially (at least the major sources) would seem to better allow us to negate the suffering of others. If we were to neglect this fact, we would either end up unable to aid others and/or like Buridan’s ass. Luckily, the world is in such a situation where many people have much more than they could ever need, and therefore have much they could give. Those in need, on the other hand, are often so desperate that pocket change to others can be life-changing to them. Therefore, given that doing so will not cause us suffering roughly similar in strength to that which those we are assisting are suffering, we ought attempt to negate the suffering of those in the world suffering most. This book will discuss various causes that seem to be high-impact in this regard; however, it is not an exhaustive list. Finding blind spots in lists, including and similar to this one, is an important task.

§2. The first way in which we can do a lot of good has been remarked upon most famously by Singer in his Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Singer asks us to imagine we come across a child drowning in a shallow pond. We could save the child, but at the cost of ruining our new shoes. Singer concludes that we ought save the child. Given the fact that the child’s drowning would cause more suffering than ruining one’s shoes, we can agree with Singer. Singer then remarks that we find ourselves in this situation daily. For very little cost to ourselves, we could save the life of a young child (or adult) in Sub-Saharan Africa, or some other impoverished part of the world.

Knowing this fact, we should be much more generous with our wealth. After covering the cost of housing, food, transportation, some minimal savings, etc., one should commit as much of their income and wealth as possible to effective charitable organizations focusing on causes of intense suffering.[22] Those we are giving to simply need the money more than we do, and so we should happily hand it over to them. Effective causes include disease treatment and prevention, nutritional support, educational support, and direct cash donations, although this list is not complete. Similar remarks apply to those without food or housing that we often pass in our own communities and those near to us. These individuals are often overlooked, although they are equal to us, and most likely have more of a reason to possess the excess portion of our wealth than we do. As Parfit remarks: ‘This wealth is legally ours. But these poorest people have much stronger moral claims to some of this wealth.’

§3. As mentioned earlier, the qualification for membership within the moral circle is the ‘capacity-to-suffer’. We must work to right the wrongs of the past, which failed to recognize all those with the ‘capacity-to-suffer’ as having proportionally equal moral worth. Human rights have come a long way since the beginning; conquest, torture, and slavery have been increasingly recognized as wrong and done away with. Those from other nations, or with different skin colors, or genders from each other, etc., have objectively equal moral worth and value. Person A suffering 4 is equivalent to Person B or C suffering likewise.

We can cut out of the moral circle those who cannot feel pain. This includes rocks, plants, nature,[23] computers, numbers, and insects, among possible others. If we find out one of these cases is not true, or if circumstances change, we must adjust and integrate that being into the moral circle immediately.

Nearly universally throughout human history, we have counted animals as worthless, or in rare cases, as discounted. We now know that animals suffer roughly equivalently to us, and hence have equal moral value. If I had to either kick Doug or Dog equally as hard, and they would suffer equally, this would be a case of equal value. I could choose to kick either one and not be acting wrongly. Many people will be appalled and claim that you shouldn’t kick Doug. In this case, you don’t have to. However, if we could either kick Doug with strength-7 or Dog with strength-8, we should kick Doug, as 7 < 8.

The more practical case, given most of us aren’t kicking dogs, is our treatment of animals that are bred for food. This unnecessary and cruel practice should be looked upon as equivalent to slavery or torture. It must be stopped at once, and it is of the utmost importance that people begin to recognize the duty that they have to negate the suffering of animals.[24] The duty to negate comes from the suffering, not the sufferer.

The point is often made (such as by Kant) that we should avoid cruelty towards animals insofar as it will lead to cruelty towards humans. While the reasoning is flawed, the conclusion is true. Cruelty towards animals does lead to cruelty towards humans, and I’d like to hope that reflection on our treatment of our non-human relatives who can suffer, will also lead us to reflect on our treatment of our fellow humans.

The critique of Kant’s argument is quite simple. I could imagine a possible world in which a man’s psychological state makes it so that there is no risk of his being cruel towards his fellow humans, or degrading his own humanity, as a consequence of his torturing animals. Because in this world, the act of torturing an animal would still be objectionable, Kant’s reasoning is clearly incorrect.

§4. Being kind to others reduces suffering insofar as it can improve someone’s day, put others at ease, and make the kind person feel better themselves. As cliché as it sounds, being kind is an easy way to reduce the suffering of the world and is therefore something we ought do.

It seems hard to determine whether it is the kindly feeling directed towards others which leads to a general feeling of enjoyment, or if enjoyment leads one towards expressing kindly feelings. I suspect that both may be the case to some degree. Either way, the calm cheerfulness which seems to accompany kindness is obviously superior to resigned indifference.[25]

§5. Ethics is the field that often takes questions of suffering as its subject matter. Because of this, it holds a privileged position among the academic disciplines. The problems of ethics are pressing in that we ought to solve them. This is because solving problems in ethics can lead to great reductions in suffering. Therefore, ethics should be promoted around the world, and bright minds should try to solve our most pressing questions, which often relate to suffering.

Of course, other fields are in similar positions in their own ways. A new way to generate energy could lift millions out of poverty and famine, just as with a different industry, etc. There are many parts to play in the pursuit of abolishing suffering, and they are all important.

Seeking the truth is almost universally taken to be right. While seeking truth nearly always produces good results, it should be noted that, like all things, it is only good insofar as it leads to less suffering, not good in-itself (as we saw in Book III). Truths like how many spiders live in Chicago, or how many blades of grass are in some field, are examples of truths that there is no duty to pursue. Therefore, neither ‘there is a duty to seek the truth’, nor ‘there is a duty to tell the truth’ are necessarily true, and hence are not objective moral facts. Although these are often maxims we often ought adopt in everyday life, this is due to their tendency to negate suffering.

Of course, given the fact that our grasp of the moral law depends in part on the bounds of our reason and imagination, it seems that knowledge and creativity, which can be used to craft thought experiments, are of great importance to humanity, and so should often be pursued and allowed to flourish.

§6. Similar to truth, freedom is usually seen as good in-itself. However, this is not so. It is only freedom-from-suffering which is good in-itself. Imagine the government which has authority over me, passes a law that states I cannot add more than four thousand windows to my house. Given that my house could account for such a large number of windows, this would certainly be a restriction on my freedom. Who in their right mind, however, could find any complaint with this law from the fact that it limits my freedom in-itself?[26]

Next, imagine that I am stranded in the desert. I am parched, and a man passes by me with water, which I ask for a drink of. The man refuses, and then remarks on the beauty of the fact that in the desert, one has complete freedom to do as they wish. I couldn’t care less however, that I am free to yell, dig, or run in any direction I please. The freedom that interests me is only freedom-from-suffering, which only water would currently provide me with.

Of course, our common conception of freedom often overlaps with freedom-from-suffering; most clearly in cases of serfdom and slavery. Laws limiting the freedom to share ideas and expression will also lead to suffering, as a society kept in ignorance will find it hard to bring forth solutions to their sufferings, especially if they are restricted in working together in this pursuit. As Kant put it: ‘The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings.’[27]

§7. Talkativeness seems to be a disposition which has the potential to often cause others suffering, even if it is generally slight. The sufferings of talkativeness come from annoyance and speaking ill of others. Annoyance can occur without any ill-will of the speaker, but simply from their repetitiveness. Speaking ill of others can occur both from malice, and without malice. The former is easier to grasp, as obviously, hurling hateful insults at another without some expectability of a reduction in suffering only increases the suffering of the world unnecessarily, and hence, is an example of transgression. Often however, we find ourselves speaking ill of others simply to fill up the time and/or the conversation. Although we can attempt to avoid speaking of others in this way by instantiating a good-will, this often fails simply due to the conversation drifting and carrying on, or instead still results in annoyance. Therefore, one should often take silence as a maxim, especially given we often turn to conversation in an attempt to dispel our boredom.

§8. Various other random truths, such as getting adequate sleep, maintaining a good [vegan] diet, maintaining one’s health (i.e. exercising, not smoking), etc., seem trivial, but are essential to a life undisturbed by suffering.

§9. Despite my praise of neutrality and critique of pleasure-chasing, I do not deny that a life spent perpetually sitting in one’s room would not be ideal. We are social creatures, and are prone to go mad if we isolate ourselves to the extreme. Many of us must go to work, go to the store, care for our loved ones, interact with others, maintain strong social bonds, exercise to maintain our health, learn, etc. In light of this, rather than a complete repellence of pleasure, I instead suggest occasional indulgence in simple-pleasures, such as walking, reading, calmly socializing, or enjoying beautiful views. There is no duty to do these things in-themselves, but they seem almost ‘necessary’ to life.

§10. Outside of these considerations, if one is unsure what to do, simply take as your maxim to negate suffering, prioritizing those whom are suffering most, and frequently ask yourself how you can most effectively do so. The righteous man instantiates a good-will; go, and do thou likewise.

NOTE - Both love and hatred are positive feedback loops.

Appendix: World-Exploders

The most common and arguably most powerful argument against suffering-focused ethical systems such as mine, has come from the following paragraph, written by R.N. Smart in 1958:

“Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race. Now it is empirically certain that there would be some suffering before all those alive on any proposed destruction day were to die in the natural course of events. Consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the ruler’s duty.”

As this conclusion seems deeply troubling to most, it puts to the test our ethical maxim. This extreme thought experiment must then be dealt with in order for us to maintain our current idea of duty. Luckily, I do not think this situation is quite as troubling as it seems.

Although the destruction of humanity takes center stage in this scenario, the most important properties of this destruction are: instantaneousness and painlessness. Those who use this argument often ignore these conditions, and simply apply the conclusions of Smart’s arguments to the modern world. If, while typing this next sentence, the whole world were instantly and painlessly destroyed, no unfulfilled duties will be present. Therefore, no badness would be present. This itself does not seem unintuitive. However, that we ought bring about this state; that is what troubles us. Smart then gives us another conditional: we must imagine that suffering will occur if the world is not destroyed. This is never specified however, and this vagueness allows us to create our own thought experiments. Imagine:

Rustic World-Exploder: An extremely powerful coronal mass ejection from the sun has caused all advanced technology on earth to become defunct and unrestorable. The world has fallen into chaos, with murder, torture, and slavery returning to become commonplace. Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race.

In such a case, I hardly think that the idea of world destruction would cause the same tension in our confidence that there is an objective duty to negate suffering. Many may even come to look upon this as a blessing, or indeed a duty. The truth displayed here is that: those forms of life which consist of intense suffering can be much worse than death. If one doubts this, simply imagine yourself confined to a torture chamber for a long period of time, being slowly cut apart, or skinned, etc. Of course, this case was specifically crafted in order to display this conclusion. Consider a more realistic case:

Realistic World-Exploder: The most powerful ruler on earth, realizes that he has a duty to prevent suffering, and so plans to do so with the most suitable means humanity possesses: a large nuclear arsenal. He carries out this plan, which leads to 98% of the population being instantaneously and painlessly exterminated. However, a significant number of groups of both humans and animals remain. These groups struggle for survival until their eventual deaths. Radiation poisoning, severe burns, infighting, and disease are common. Some children are produced by these people and live short, similarly wretched lives in the resultant nuclear wasteland.

This to me seems to be the most likely outcome of some human adopting the maxim of the destruction of humanity, and, given the intense suffering involved, would likely count against this maxim. This allows us to posit that: if the destruction of humanity would be extremely drawn-out and painful, we ought-not bring it about.

Let us now take a scenario in which Smart’s assumption of suffering occurring on ‘destruction day’ does not obtain:

Futuristic World-Exploder: In the year 2200 humanity has completely eliminated suffering. Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race.

Here, there is obviously no duty to destroy humanity; not even Smart would argue this. Seeing as we can currently either attempt something Realistic, or strive for something Futuristic, it seems to me quite clear that we have a duty towards the latter. Given both scenarios take as their maxim: negate suffering, prioritizing stronger sufferings over weaker ones, it does not seem to me clear why we should be compelled to pick the destructive route, rather than the suffering-eliminative route. The way to overcome this thought-experiment is to accept its extremely constrained and well-crafted conclusion: if the world contains suffering which cannot be easily remedied, and it can be instantaneously and painlessly destroyed, it ought be. However, if this destruction can only be done painfully, and/or over time, it ought be avoided, and suffering ought be negated through different methods, as it seems is both possible, and likely given advancements in technology and looking at the course of history. Given the world is of the latter kind, we should stop worrying about world destruction, and find more productive ways to negate the sufferings of ourselves and others.

Notes:

[1] Two [non-exhaustive] features (1) No emotion, (2) No contradictions.

[2] 3 examples of inference: (1.) If I know a → b and b → c, then I can infer
a → c. (2.) If I know Jim’s shirt is all-red right now, I can infer that his shirt is not all-blue right now. (3.) If I know x+3=8, I can infer that x=5.

[3] Some use the term ‘intellectual seeming’; Gödel says these beliefs ‘force themselves upon us’ as logically necessary.

[4] Of course, we still often disagree about non-natural facts. This disagreement must come from some form of partiality.

[5] Some may argue that we do indeed come to understand LNC through empirical means, such as constantly seeing that all-blue things are not all-red, or that trees are not cats. However, the fact that we can abstract LNC onto any possible fact is what demarcates it from being contingent and naturalistic. On the other hand, facts such as ‘grass is green’ are not abstractable, as we could easily imagine blue grass.

[6] Take killing: Most people wouldn’t claim ‘killing is wrong’, insofar as this fails to allow for cases of self-defense, nor ‘killing is wrong only on Tuesdays’ for obvious reasons, etc.

[7] Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a necessary law of scenarios.

[8] Kant remarked that we can act according to duty, contrary to duty, or from duty. This implies that the duty exists either way, even given we have a total lack of awareness of it. We recognize this to be true with most other facts, such as the fact that the reason the Earth orbits the Sun is because of gravity; and this even before we were aware of gravity, or the fact that the Earth orbited the Sun.

[9] “Father forgive them, for they know not what they do.” - Luke, 23:34

[10] ‘Not, of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are within our control.’ - Kant, Groundwork 4:394

[11] I feel inclined to mention that both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ forms of suffering are here covered under the umbrella term ‘suffering’, as well as the fact that I am referring only to ‘experienced suffering’.

[12] Samyutta Nikaya, Bk. 2, 12.24. I imagine the similarity to the C.I. is clear.

[13] Some may claim that God could not order something which was wrong. By this however, they mean that it would not be wrong insofar as his ordering it so necessarily makes it right, not insofar as he couldn’t conceivably order an act such as torturing someone for no apparent reason. This latter aspect is what we are here analyzing.

[14] The components of ‘strength’ will be discussed shortly.

[15] i.e. No change in the duty can occur without a change in the suffering the duty is referencing.

[16] “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” - Mark 12:31

[17] Similarly, two jets each traveling together at 1000-mph would have a speed of 1000-mph. Nobody would claim that any 2000-mph value exists relevantly in this scenario. They would reach a destination at the same time as a lone jet traveling 1000-mph ceteris paribus. Duties act in a similar way.

[18] A set is a group of individuals who must be affected together.

[19] The Repugnant Conclusion is rendered impotent by this fact. The suffering of each of ten billion individuals stubbing their toe would pale in comparison to the suffering of one individual being tortured.

[20] Rawls seems to have come to a similar conclusion:
‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged’.

[21] Two of Sidgwick’s three axioms, those of Justice and Rational Benevolence echo this truth. I also hold Sidgwick’s Axiom of Prudence to be true. Taken as a sum, I prefer to think of these axioms as a formulation of a single Axiom of Total Impartiality; which is to say, necessity.

[22] “If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.”
- Matthew 19:21

[23] Protecting nature is often an instrumental duty. For example, we ought not destroy the Amazon, not for the trees’ and rivers’ sake, but in order to prevent the consequences which would affect many beings on our planet with the capacity-to-suffer.

[24] There is no reason I can see why wild animals would not be included in this as well. Although it may be harder to reduce the suffering of wild animals, that does not mean an attempt cannot be made.

[25] When Sidgwick for example speaks of the relationship of duty and desire, he criticizes those who are ‘contented pigs’ for setting their desires on less than ideal ends, such as crude pleasures. It would have been odd however if Sidgwick had instead criticized people he described as simply ‘content’, but who set their desires on dutiful ends, such as reducing the suffering of others.

[26] Some may argue that my being ‘singled out’ or ‘treated uniquely’ is enough reason for protest. While I disagree with this reasoning, it can easily be disregarded. Simply imagine that everyone had such a law imposed upon them. In such a scenario, I could still find no reason for dissent.

[27] An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?